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Introduction
American Studies Encounters the Middle East
Alex Lubin and Marwan M. Kraidy
In the hills above the Casino du Liban, in the predominantly Maronite
Catholic Keserwan district of Lebanon, sits El Rancho, a Texas-style
dude ranch that hosts the Cedar Stampede Rodeo, a Sunday Texas barbeque, evening campfires, and deluxe lodging in “genuine” Sioux Indian
tepees. El Rancho is a tourist destination in which visitors, some of whom
may be both Lebanese and American, recreate a mythic U.S. frontier, a
landscape populated by images of cowboys and American Indians made
popular in globalized U.S. culture. El Rancho promises visitors “an au
thentic Tex-Mex experience,” where they can “set off on a dude ranch
escape.” For Lebanese and regional visitors who may not know the meaning of the term “dude ranch,” the El Rancho website provides ample
definition and examples. According to its advertising, “El Rancho Lebanon is modeled on the history of ranching in the United States, a history that can be accessed through the iconography of the ‘wild west’ made
popular in the Hollywood Western.” Visitors can go to El Rancho to indulge in Angus beef hamburgers imported from the United States in a
restaurant that recreates a western saloon, with John Wayne paraphernalia. Moreover, visitors can walk through a recreated western town filled
with wooden statues of cowboys and forlorn images of defeated, but
noble, Indians.1
El Rancho is a private venture owned by a Lebanese businessperson,
but the U.S. consulate and several U.S.-based corporations such as Baskin-
Robbins and Krispy Kreme sponsor some of its activities, including the
annual Cedar Stampede Rodeo. In this sense, although El Rancho is a
private Lebanese venture, it is connected to the United States not only
because it features a version of U.S.—Tex-Mex—culture but also because
it receives authenticity through occasional sponsorship of the U.S.
consulate.
Although El Rancho promises an authentic Tex-Mex experience, its
symbols and icons have been reorganized and shuffled so that various
particularities of western U.S. expansion are confused. The advertised
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Totem pole with cowboy hat announcing the turn-off to El Rancho, Ghodras,
Lebanon. Photo taken by Alex Lubin.

Photos of John Wayne and Johnny Cash on the wall at El Rancho’s “western”
saloon, where Angus beef hamburgers are imported from the United States.
Photo taken by Alex Lubin.

“Sioux Indian Teepees,” for example, might be found in the Northern
Plains of the United States, but not in the U.S.–Mexico borderlands.
Moreover, the activities available at El Rancho are not exclusively related
to the mythical U.S. west. Among the activities advertised on the El Rancho website are “Espionage Wars” or “Roman Games.” This mish-mash
of seemingly random cultural activities presents a mediated vision of
American culture, inaccurate in its history and geography but compelling in its iconography, disassociated from its original referent.
What makes El Rancho so fascinating is not only how U.S. culture
travels internationally and is received in non-U.S. destinations but also
how American culture circulates between and within complex geopo
litical realities. The United States relationship with Lebanon is currently
tense, as Hezbollah—a political party the United States regards as a
terrorist organization—controls many areas of the Lebanese government.
Moreover, Lebanon’s capitol, Beirut, was the scene of a major U.S. military defeat, as U.S. forces intending to intervene in Lebanon’s bloody
civil war came under attack in 1983. Following the bombing of the U.S.
marine barracks in Beirut, in which 299 American and French soldiers
died, President Ronald Reagan prevented all direct, nonstop flights from
Lebanon to the United States, a ban that continues to this day. Moreover, U.S. support for successive Israeli military occupations and attacks
in Lebanon has only escalated Lebanese criticism of U.S. foreign policy.
During the last two decades of the twentieth century Lebanon had been
the scene of covert U.S. military intervention as well as kidnappings and
assassinations of U.S. diplomats and American citizens. Given the thorny
realities of U.S.–Lebanese geopolitics, it is even more curious why American culture circulates so prominently in Lebanon at places like El Rancho. Why would the American frontier play such a prominent role in a
Lebanese tourist venue at a time when U.S. foreign policy is under intense Lebanese scrutiny?
Within the United States, the western frontier mythology thrives as
well. It sutures together stories of cowboys and Indians in sparsely populated western landscapes with an i magined past—one that is used to explain who Americans are (or are not) as “a people” and often to hide the
way this past is tied to a legacy of settler violence that underwrites much
of the United States’ national development. But what might t hese things
mean in Lebanon? Perhaps the U.S. west represents something altogether
different. It might signify how icons of American culture circulate in the
Arab world, but it might also mean something about the borders and
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Stereotypical American Indian statue holding cedar branch (the symbol of
Lebanon) inside El Rancho, Lebanon. Photo taken by Alex Lubin.

frontiers of Lebanon or about the location of colonized “reservations”—
Palestinian refugee camps—within Lebanon’s borders.
Perhaps El Rancho is rooted to a genealogy of American exceptionalism intended to elide the legacy of conquest in the making of American
culture and to a Lebanese desire for a (translated) version of American frontiers. Beyond the influence of the United States, El Rancho assumes many meanings as American culture gets reconstituted in ways
that make tenuous its cultural and material referents. Hence, there is
both something especially American and something foreign to Amer
ica that El Rancho Lebanon is attempting to market and that the U.S.
embassy is occasionally willing to sponsor. The seeming chaotic pastiche
of El Rancho Lebanon might expose the contradictions inherent to both
states and in this way becomes something that resides beyond any one
nation. In its travels, American culture gets translated in ways that reveal
the political unconscious of both its location of origin and its arrival
destination.
American Studies Encounters the Middle East attempts to understand the
dense and overlapping global cultural processes that make El Rancho intelligible as well as the complex narratives El Rancho tells about the
United States and about globalized American culture. We are interested
in how U.S. culture travels and the curious ways that notions of “Amer
ica” transform in the process of international and global circulation.
Moreover, in this collection, we are interested in how American culture
circulates in the M
 iddle East and North Africa within changing geopo
litical contexts. We therefore focus our analysis on the historical encounters, especially of the M
 iddle East in America in the making of early
American culture as well as the contemporary encounter as it is s haped
in the context of changing U.S. global prestige and political realities
across the Arab world. These are topics that have renewed currency in
the present moment given the changing geopolitical relationship of
United States to the Middle East in particular.
El Rancho is but one example of the ways that cultural meanings are
produced through movement, travel, and media—the Hollywood western
being a relevant and familiar example in this case—as the idea of America
is translated by and for Lebanese audiences. Yet, like all travel, cultural
flows move within particular and shifting geopolitical topographies. It was
the great contribution of Birmingham cultural studies scholars to illustrate how culture and material conditions are dialectically related in
ways that suggest culture as a site of negotiation of material politics and
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not merely a reflection of representation. And yet, despite the impor
tant influence of Birmingham cultural studies over the discipline of
American cultural studies, and despite the internationalist bent and transnational approach of leading figures like Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy,
questions of international geopolitics and U.S. foreign relations—in the
Middle East, especially—have been largely overlooked by the discipline (and w
 ere sometimes relegated to postcolonial theory, a formation
that U.S. cultural studies has tended to keep at an arm’s length). As a result, and despite the avowedly anti-exceptionalist bent of American
studies since at least the 1970s, the field remains largely rooted to an exceptionalist framework in which knowledge about the United States
produced within the United States remains a privileged vantage point.2
Our goal with this collection is not merely to continue the ongoing
process of internationalizing American studies approaches by including
non-U.S. scholars and viewpoints but rather, by featuring multidisciplinary perspectives on the Arab–U.S. relation from scholars based in
both the Middle East and the United States, we aim to place the discipline in transit in order to explore how cultural forms circulate transnationally and are shaped by and contribute to international geopolitical
contexts. In particular, we seek to understand the possibilities of American studies during a moment of profound geopolitical transformation
and during a historical conjuncture we identify by the end of the “American Century” and the ongoing social upheaval of the so-called Arab
Spring. This is a conjuncture dominated by global economic and politi
cal crises that have momentous implications for the M
 iddle East and pose
unique challenges to scholars attempting to understand the meaning
of U.S. economic, military, and cultural power.
The internationalization of the discipline of American studies is not
new, having its roots in the earliest years of the institutionalization of
the field. Throughout the 1950s as American studies programs w
 ere forming across the American academy, similar programs were formed in allied European countries. American studies institutes at Salzburg and
Bologna led to the formation of a European American studies center in
the mid-1950s. By 1964 the Fulbright-Hayes Act instituted an American
studies international exchange program that helped foster university
exchanges and American studies lecturers abroad, especially in allied
Western European countries. Alongside the Fulbright program, the
United States Information Agency (USIA) spread American history and
culture as cultural diplomacy, and in this way the spread of the discipline
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of American studies would be carefully managed alongside efforts to
spread an image of American power. American studies programs emerged
in allied countries as a means to consolidate U.S. power over “the West,”
even as scholars within international American studies centers brought
their own interests and agendas to the project.3
The internationalization of the field of American studies did not include the M
 iddle East u
 ntil 1998, however, when the first American studies program was launched at the University of Bahrain. By this time, the
Cold War was over and the U.S. military presence across the M
 iddle East
was escalating. American studies programs once again were seen as useful platforms for cultural diplomacy, but the context for the post–Cold
War internationalization of the field was significantly different than it
was during the Cold War for a couple reasons. First, American studies
entered the M
 iddle East at a time when it was difficult to export an exceptionalist vision of American benevolence. The American studies program in Bahrain, for example, opened just two years following the
formation of a permanent military base in Bahrain, and in this way
American studies programs in the region would always be shadowed by
the presence of the U.S. military.
Moreover, American studies programs emerged in the M
 iddle East in
places where an increasing popular and intellectual skepticism about the
primacy of American power went hand-in-hand with official closeness
to U.S. foreign policy. Following the formation of the State Department–
sponsored program for American studies in Bahrain w
 ere the formation
of programs at the University of Jordan and in East Jerusalem, at Al-Quds
University. These programs, like the one at Bahrain, would have a specific mandate to educate a moderate leadership favorable to U.S. interests, including the interests of such U.S. allies as Israel, Jordan, and the
Gulf monarchies. Still, it would be increasingly difficult to exert the
tutelary power of American empire in these geographies given how
American support for Israel would increasingly be identified as a key culprit in the instability of the region, especially in places where there
were large numbers of Palestinian refugees.
While the Palestine question was largely taboo within American studies in the United States, at least u
 ntil very recently, across the Arab region the question of Palestine was formative of regional understandings
of American culture and power. As a result of the preeminent role of
the Palestine question across the Middle East and its relative absence
within the State Department vision of the field, a widening chasm di8 Alex Lubin And Marwan M. Kraidy

vided the vision of the discipline from the U.S. State Department and
regional practitioners across the Middle East. Like the folklore of the
Hollywood western depicted in El Rancho Lebanon, American studies
across the M
 iddle East would be its own discipline, sometimes working
in opposition to the State Department mandate of its donors.4
The particularities of the internationalization of American studies
into the Middle East in conjunction with the changing fortunes and preeminence of the United States in the region raises important questions
about the relationship of knowledge production to geopolitical power
as well as about the possibilities of American studies as an intellectual
project that can be distinct from U.S. empire. Popular protest against economic inequality, social discrimination, and political repression have
swept the globe from Wisconsin to Greece, from Israel to Russia, from
Spain to New York, culminating with the Arab uprisings that have radically transformed Arab politics. In the United States, fierce battles over
the social contract enacted during the New Deal, intense struggles over
immigration and ethnic studies, and organized protest movements to resist neoliberal labor and social relations focus attention on new subjects
with new social imaginaries. In the Arab world, unlikely alliances of
Islamist and secular activists have dislodged autocrats entrenched in
power for decades while new fault lines emerge in the spaces made unlivable by decades of foreign intervention and military invasions. Though
oceans apart, these struggles have in common the search for human dignity in political and economic contexts that put power and resources in
the hands of the few.
In the wake of the Arab uprisings and at the twilight of the American C
 entury, American Studies Encounters the Middle East contributes to a
deeper understanding of the ways that geopolitical and academic borders of all kinds are malleable, socially constructed, and historically contingent. The primary subjects of the collection, America and the Middle
East–
North Africa (MENA), are themselves shifting imaginaries.
Historically, culturally, politically, economically, and demographically, America is in MENA and MENA is in America. Moreover, social movements and struggles shaking America and MENA (including
the Tea Party formation, the Occupy movement, and the Arab uprisings) have global ramifications; therefore, it is intellectually productive
to shift the analytical borders of America and MENA by integrating the
“Americas” or the Islamic “worlds” in a broader terrain that includes
Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America. The transnational American
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studies conjured up in our book explicates the multiple and mutual entanglements of “America” and the “Middle East.”
American Studies Encounters the M
 iddle East addresses two related areas
of American Studies scholarship: First, the collection aims to historicize
the political, social, and cultural encounters that have taken place between the United States and MENA. Modalities of interaction including
missionary work, “public diplomacy,” lethal drones, and hip-hop reflect
a historically deep, politically unsettled, and culturally complicated encounter between the United States and the Arab world. Second, by
counterposing the Arab Spring to the American Century, this volume
pushes for critical engagement with the trope of the “American C
 entury”
and attendant notions. It is well known that the discipline of American
studies emerged within the context of the Cold War and the ascendancy
of U.S. global supremacy. Since the fall of the Soviet system, however,
the discipline finds itself confronting an American empire without a
geopolitical rival, with declining geopolitical influence globally yet
enduring economic, military, and cultural supremacy. The American
Century has come to an end as the United States finds itself in a debilitating condition of permanent war (against terrorism) and declining
economic futures. Since the Middle East is a primary locus of the exercise of American warfare, examining the Arab–U.S. encounter promises
to shed critical light on how both sides of the relationship view themselves and one another.
What scholarly interventions might the end of the American Century
require? This volume argues for a continued push by American studies
toward a transnational approach that is not merely “postnationalist” as
John Carlos Rowe advocated, but that is truly global, in this case, by a full
inclusion of the voices and approaches of scholars writing from North
America, the Middle East, and elsewhere.5 American Studies Encounters the
Middle East therefore takes as its subject the complex history and present
of U.S. engagement with MENA in order to exemplify a diff erent sort of
American studies committed equally to the study of the transnational circulation of American culture outside the United States and to the circulation of other cultures in the American cultural imaginary.

The American Century
Before tracing the possibilities of American studies in the post–American
Century, it is necessary to review how the American Century helped es10 Alex Lubin And Marwan M. Kraidy

tablish the current conjecture at the beginning of the second decade of
the twenty-first century. In 1941 Henry Luce, the prolific owner of Life
magazine, published his influential essay, “The American C
 entury,” in
which he defined the contours of the post–World War II era. Writing
before U.S. entry into World War II, Luce argued that the United States
was poised to become a global leader within the West and that the nation had an indispensable, if not providential, role to play in global affairs. Luce sought to sway the U.S. government into joining World War II
and to argue against the perceived isolationism of the Roosevelt administration. Were the United States to enter the war and replace European
allies within the Atlantic world for economic and geopolitical primacy,
it would be poised to assume the mantle of global leadership through
America’s unique ability to combine free markets with free peoples.
It is for America and for America alone to determine w
 hether a
system of free economic enterprise—an economic order compatible
with freedom and progress—shall or shall not prevail in this
century. . . . We have to decide whether or not we s hall have for
ourselves and our friends freedom of the seas—the right to go with
our ships and our ocean-going airplanes where we wish, when we
wish and as we wish. The vision of America as the principal guarantor of the freedom of the seas, the vision of America as the dynamic
leader of world trade, has within it the possibilities of such enormous human progress as to stagger the imagination. Let us not be
staggered by it. Let us rise to its tremendous possibilities.6
Combined with the United States’ ability to protect and spread the free
market and, hence, global freedom, according to Luce, was the United
States’ exceptional ability to value self-determination in the international
sphere and to respect the rule of law.
Although the values of f ree markets and free societies were promoted
in Luce’s popular magazines, the geopolitical realities of the American
Century w
 ere articulated in the halls of Washington, where the federal
government developed a road map to realize Luce’s vision of an American Century. Following World War II, with the ascendance of the United
States as a global power and the start of the Cold War and its bipolar
world order, U.S. State Department officials sought to realize a vision for
the American C
 entury. The National Security Council issued policy document NSC-68 in April 1950, in which it formulated the parameters of
the policy of containment as both a foreign policy to limit the spread of
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the Soviet Union beyond the borders outlined in the “Big Three” conferences that ended World War II and as a domestic policy to contain
the threat of communism within the borders of the United States; indeed, containment was both a domestic and a foreign policy that required
investments in warfare abroad and political repression at home.
Yet the American Century was shaped by a central contradiction, one
that was identified by the important diplomatic historian from the University of Wisconsin, William Appleman Williams. In The Tragedy of
American Diplomacy, Williams argued that the Cold War was merely a
new phase in a long history of American imperial expansion. Throughout its history, Williams argued, three sometimes complementary but
more often-contradictory currents characterized American power. “In
the realm of ideas and ideals,” he argued,
American policy is guided by three conceptions. One is the warm,
generous, humanitarian impulse to help other people solve their
problems. A second is the principle of self-determination applied
at the international level, which asserts the right of e very society
to establish its own goals or objectives, and then to realize them
internally through the means it decides are appropriate. These two
ideas can be reconciled; indeed, they complement each other to an
extensive degree. But the third idea entertained by many Americans
is one that insists that other people cannot really solve their prob
lems and improve their lives unless they go about it the same way
as the United States.7
In this way Williams argued that U.S. foreign relations w
 ere always
framed through the language of benevolence and self-determination yet
were actually guided by a desire to ensure the reproduction of the American way—its system of government and economy—in non-American
places. Williams traced this impulse to the founding of the United States,
when he argued that the United States committed to an idea of freedom
tied to f ree enterprise, and American futurity tied to expanding markets and control of trade routes and infrastructure. Therefore, according to Williams, the Cold War was not a new formation but rather a
continuation of American foreign relations that w
 ere characterized by
a central contradiction. The United States would be committed to a
bounded national landscape and a boundless marketplace; these commitments, argued Williams, would inevitably produce turmoil and eventually
undermine the American Century.8 “Seen in an historical perspective,
12 Alex Lubin And Marwan M. Kraidy

therefore, what we are accustomed to call the Cold War,” Williams argued, “is in reality only the most recent phase of a more general conflict
between the established system of western capitalism and its internal and
external opponents.”9
Following World War II the United States gained economic and military control of the Atlantic world, including a seat at the head of the
economic order established in the Bretton Woods agreements as well as
a preeminent role in the newly formed international system enshrined
by the United Nations and its Security Council. The 1945 Bretton Woods
agreement that tied the global economy to gold and to U.S. notes helped
the United States secure economic control within the West over Euro
pean redevelopment plans. Japan and Europe rebuilt, often using dollars and purchasing U.S. goods. Moreover, the United States owned over
half of the world’s official gold reserves—574 million ounces at the end
of World War II—ensuring that an international economic system would
orbit around the United States.10
Throughout the first three decades of the Cold War and following
the Korean War, the United States wielded its military supremacy over the
developing world by waging proxy wars, secret wars, and counterinsurgency wars across the Third World in an effort both to push back the
gains of socialist and communist organization and to expand existing, and
to open new, American markets. Yet by the 1970s the Atlantic project
was wearing thin; the United States was embroiled in Vietnam, and there
was an overvaluation of the U.S. dollar—the bedrock exchange currency
of the international monetary system. American president Richard Nixon
broke the Bretton Woods agreement in the so-called Nixon Shock and
brought on the era of deregulations and floating currencies. Here Nixon
acted unilaterally, eschewing the internationalism that had initially established the Bretton Woods system. Nixon’s brazen move to terminate
the Bretton Woods system was one of a series of events that led to the
increasing concentration of monetary and geopolitical power in the hands
of the United States.
The United States further wielded the international economic system
and the institutions of international governance to its benefit by using
the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to enact political
changes in foreign markets through coercive lending strategies. The use
of so-called economic shocks in places like Chile in the mid-1970s to coerce political change that favored U.S. economic interests demonstrated
a concentration of economic and military power in the United States.
Introduction 13

Perhaps the most significant move t oward the making of American hegemony took place in 1985, when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
helped the United States move important deliberations of the United Nations into the exclusive club of the UN Security Council that was then
controlled by the three permanent members—the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France (the P3).11
The end of the Cold War signaled the realization of American hegemony in economic, geopolitical, and military terms. By 1997 policymakers
who had been an integral part of Reagan’s Latin America policy, including illegally funding Nicaraguan contras, began to articulate a project for
a new American C
 entury built around the idea that “American leadership is good both for America and for the world.”12 The Project for the
New American C
 entury was established to advocate within the administration the expansion American militarism, but it had to do so in new
ways given that the twentieth century’s major threat, the Soviet Union,
was no longer available. Hence, the project argued the need for significant increases in defense spending, including funds to modernize existing armed forces. It also argued that the United States’ role in foreign
affairs must revolve around the promotion of political and economic
freedom abroad. And, finally, the Project for the New American Century
revised for the twenty-first century Henry Luce’s vision of American
leadership in the world by arguing, “we need to accept responsibility for
America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.”13 From
the outset, the Project for the New American Century’s leadership recommended regime change in Iraq as a means to assert American control
of the M
 iddle East, its oil, and, most importantly, the global price of oil.
The Bush administration realized that goal following 9/11 through a
series of domestic and international actions that asserted American hegemony over the world. And yet, as we will see, the fundamental contradiction of American power identified by William Appleman Williams
endures as the movement of global capitalism would come to eclipse the
power of the United States to maintain national borders during a global
war on terror.

After the American Century
The end of the American Century and the ascendance of the global war
on terror has produced new subject formations and subjectivities that re14 Alex Lubin And Marwan M. Kraidy

quire new scholarly approaches. As George Lipsitz argues in American
Studies in a Moment of Danger, our ways of thinking about the past and
present are shaped in profound ways by the historical conjunctures that
produce our scholarly approaches. American studies scholarship has
transformed as the Cold War state that produced the field has also transformed. As Lipsitz argues, “We see now, if only in retrospect, that industrialization, nationalism, and the cold war were not just historical
processes and events—they were also ways of knowing and being. They
had their own logics and optics; they encouraged us to see some things
and prevented us from seeing others.”14 It is in the spirit of Lipsitz’s observations about the relationship of historical context and knowledge
production that American Studies Encounters the M
 iddle East asks how
the present conjunctures, including the end of the American C
 entury, the
ascendance of the global war on terror, and the rise of the Arab uprisings produce new ways of “knowing and being.”
Against the backdrop of profound political, economic, environmental, and social local and global transformations by grounding itself in
Arab–U.S. relations, this volume seeks to deepen the expansion of American studies in a global context that Giovanni Arrighi has called a “post-
American” world.15 Scholars in various disciplines have noted the relative
decline in America’s global power,16 and in recent years the debate spilled
over to public debate, pitting North American pundits like Fareed Zakaria and Robert Kagan against each other.17 International relations scholars have, for some time, argued that the American empire is losing global
influence.18 The question of America’s place in the world remains hotly
contested in public discourse and academic circles.
Political economists and world system theories have argued that the
contradictions William Appleman Williams identified at the outset of
the Cold War are not only the contradiction of political liberalism but
are more fundamentally contradictions applicable to capitalism. Giovanni
Arrighi and Immanuel Wallerstein, to take just two examples, have argued that the American C
 entury is merely the name for a stage in capi
talist development—a cycle of accumulation and surplus—that would
inevitably decline or transform as a result of the flexibility of capital.
They argue that beginning in the 1970s global capital has eclipsed the
nation form as the most important unit of global power. For example,
in his forecast of the end of American hegemony, Immanuel Wallerstein
argues that while the United States remains economically and militarily
dominant, it no longer maintains its global prestige or its ability to dictate
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global events as it did during the Cold War. For Wallerstein, the end of
the American empire is partly due to replacement of the nation with the
global financial system as well as the emergence of new economic and
geopolitical rivals, particularly Japan and Germany.19
Similarly, Arrighi has argued that the end of the American Century
marks the decline of the American global hegemony. Arrighi reminds
us that Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony relies not only on a notion of top-down dominance but also the production of consent from
below. While the United States was hegemonic during the Cold War,
Arrighi argues that this status has changed, particularly in the wake of
the U.S. war on terror. Now, Arrighi argues, the United States is merely
globally dominant while lacking the sort of global consent of U.S. rule
that dominated during the Cold War. Importantly, Arrighi’s diagnosis
of American geopolitical power is tied to his understanding of global and
transnational capitalist development.
As he argued in The Long Twentieth C
 entury, U.S. geopolitical power
was merely a phase of capitalist development rooted to the territory of
the United States. Overaccumulation, argues Arrighi, has led the United
States to expand territorially through war and geopolitical power. Yet the
ability of the United States to expend its surplus is waning as it becomes
more difficult for it to dictate world events in ways that favor its economic wishes. Moreover, Arrighi forecasts a “re-centering of the global
political economy on East Asia” that w
 ill further characterizes the U.S.
20
“dominance without hegemony.”
Published in 2002, a decade before the argument moved to English-
language outlets, Emmanuel Todd’s Après l’empire: Essai sur la décomposition
du système américain harnessed a wealth of demographic, cultural, economic, industrial, and military data to argue that “America is a great
nation whose power has been incontestable, but whose decline appears
irreversible.”21 Similarly, Stephen Walt, in his article “The End of the
American Era,” argues that “when a state stands alone at the pinnacle of
power . . . there is nowhere to go but down.”22 Walt argues that the
“American era” of the Cold War decades was characterized by an inflated
sense of peril and bipolarity. In reality, argues Walt, U.S. hegemony was
secure throughout the Cold War as the United States operated without
a serious military or economic rival. The fall of the Soviet Union, however, coupled with the decline in the U.S. economy has brought the
American era to an end. T
 here are new emerging areas of geopolitical
power, most prominently in Asia. Moreover, for Walt, the Arab Spring
16 Alex Lubin And Marwan M. Kraidy

most clearly demonstrates the decline of the American era, as the United
States has been a marginal influence in developments across the MENA.
However, Walt notes that while the American era is coming to a
close, American power is still hegemonic; it is merely less influential.
Hence, according to Walt,
the real question was always whether what one might term the
“American Era” was nearing its end. Specifically might the United
States remain the strongest global power but be unable to exercise
the same influence it once enjoyed? If that is the case—and I believe
it is—then Washington must devise a grand strategy that acknowledges this new reality but still uses America’s enduring assets to
advance the national interest.23
Despite forecasts of geopolitical decline, we do not underestimate the
enduring hegemony of U.S. military power globally. In 2012–13, the
United States had special operations forces (military personal who operate beyond the reach of international law) covering 60 percent of the
globe. The United States currently has no military rival. Yet, for the purposes of our argument, we suggest that the ability of the United States
to shape the course of the future in its vision of the world order is over.
The United States cannot speak of a “new world order” b
 ecause it cannot shape events as it once could, or at least as it thought it could.
Moreover, the U.S. economy is no longer globally supreme, as China
has recently surpassed the United States for the world’s largest economy.
Perhaps most significantly, American influence is in decline—it can no
longer dictate events across the globe in ways that it once did, and this is
in part due to the renewed economic strength of new multilateral co
alitions of state that emerge from the global south, such as the BRICS
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), which have established trade and other economic policy beyond the networks of U.S.-
led neoliberal economic policy. Nowhere, we argue, is the declining
influence of the U.S. empire more visib
 le than in the events of 2011–13
in the Arab world, the so-called Arab uprisings or spring.

Transnational American Studies in These Times
Transnational American studies is not merely the study of global flows
of culture, people, economies, and resources across national boundaries
but also of complex geopolitical relations that inform the infrastructure
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of circulation and the reception of America beyond the United States.
Transnational American culture is enabled by the transnationalization
of U.S.-led global economies and hegemony. Yet, as American culture
travels, it becomes unmoored from its origin and can signify something
entirely different in and for a non-U.S. audience. In this way the transnational flow of American culture enables a critical view of American
culture that is often occluded within the United States. To take the case
of El Rancho Lebanon, we can see how, in the flow of the U.S. “Wild
West” to Lebanon, we witness the unmooring of western iconography
from the state project of U.S. settler colonial expansion and its reinscription in Lebanese national culture.
In this volume, we are interested in American studies in transit during a geopolitical moment characterized by declining U.S. global influence and ubiquitous American cultural global circulation worldwide. The
presidency of George W. Bush and his administration’s handling of the
September 11, 2001, attacks and their aftermath has been disastrous for
perceptions of the United States in the Arab world. A
 fter what appeared
to be a promising start, the Obama administration has failed to convince
public opinion in the Middle East that there have been any fundamental changes to U.S. policy toward the region, and, if anything, drone
strikes and support for the violence of regional allies like Saudi Arabia
and Israel have only made life across MENA more precarious. The United
States, it seems, is set on a path in its relation to the Arab world that
is difficult to reverse. And yet, despite the enduring power of the
United States, American prestige across the M
 iddle East seems to be
in decline.
The Arab uprisings of 2011 made starkly visible the declining geopo
litical influence of the United States in the Arab world. This is a decline
that began before the Arab uprisings, throughout the Cold War, with
the unconditional aid the United States provided to Israel in the face of
Israeli aggression in the Arab world. This support has endured even beyond the utility, it could be argued, of Israel as a strategic ally in the region.24 Moreover, decades of U.S.-driven World Bank neoliberal lending
has created vast problems of poverty and hopelessness across much of the
Arab region well before the January 25, 2011, protests. Although the uprisings are directed against authoritarian regimes and not the United
States, there is evidence that protesters saw the struggle against authoritarian rule as a means to reject the U.S.-dominated economic and military order.25
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If U.S. prestige in MENA has been in decline since 1948, but especially since Oslo neoliberalism,26 it was arguably the recent United States
votes against recognizing Palestinian statehood in the United Nations
that signaled the end of an American-dominated era in the region. The
United States recently voted for the second time in two years against recognition of a Palestinian state in the United Nations. It stood with nine
other countries over which it has economic and military control. Striking in the vote is that the United States can no longer count on Euro
pean allies to stand against the Arab world—although some European
allies chose to abstain from the vote. Moreover, while the European
Union has begun to consider a boycott of Israeli settlement-produced
goods, the United States remains firmly committed to its Israel policy,
even a fter the alarming devastation brought on by successive invasions
of Gaza.
After the U.S.-orchestrated and -led invasions of Iraq and Afghani
stan and the many scandals of the George W. Bush presidency—Abu
Ghraib, Guantanamo, torture, rendition—the Obama presidency was initially perceived as a radical shift in U.S. policy t oward the M
 iddle East.
Obama’s famous June 4, 2009, Cairo speech raised expectations that
a fundamentally new U.S. approach to the MENA region was afoot.
Within months, however, the Arab press began echoing rising public sentiments that the change was one of style, not substance. The Obama
administration’s calculated response to the Arab uprisings, however cautious, angered both revolutionary forces, who lamented U.S. hypocrisy
on democracy and human rights, and counterrevolutionary rollback led
by Saudi Arabia, irate at Obama’s abandonment of longtime U.S. and
Saudi ally Hosni Mubarak. Continued U.S. support for Israeli policies,
Obama’s escalation of drone warfare, and the administrations flagrant
disregard for the Bahraini uprising dashed any remaining illusions about
changes in U.S.–Middle East policies. The U.S. administration’s initially
timid rapprochement with Iran and rumors of a pending nuclear deal,
in addition to Obama’s not-so-red “red line” on chemical weapons use
in Syria, transformed disappointment with U.S. policies to anger and opposition among steadfast allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council, led by
Saudi Arabia. Columns with titles such “America’s Weakness and Its
Crisis” and “Who Is Responsible for Decline in U.S. Influence in the
World?” have proliferated in the Arab—and even Israeli—press.27
If the 2003 invasion of Iraq signaled the apex of U.S. power, the Arab
uprisings have since their onset in late 2010 confirmed the decline of
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American global might. The United States government appeared more
blindsided by the swift toppling of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia
than embarrassed by a WikiLeaks document revealing the chumminess
of Ben Ali’s autocracy with Western governments. After much dithering in Egypt over Mubarak, the Obama administration announced it was
ceasing its support to longtime U.S. ally Hosni Mubarak and has since
then followed a road of inconsistency and ambiguity in dealing with
Mubarak’s successors, Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood and
Abdel Fattah El-Sisi of the military. On Libya, the administration “led
from behind,” essentially assisting while the French and British took the
lead in North Atlantic Treaty Organization efforts to help rebels against
Muammar Gaddafi, but in the wake of Gaddafi’s deposition, violence and
political instability in Libya has only escalated. In Syria, rhetorical condemnation of Bashar al-Assad and lukewarm support of the rebels fueled a narrative that the United States, alongside Israel, was interested
in seeing the two sides of the Syrian conflict bleed each other out. In
Bahrain, the administration gave lip service to the rhetoric of human
rights while supporting Saudi-led repression of dissent. Reactive and
seemingly ad hoc, the U.S. response to the Arab uprisings has been consistently inconsistent.
It is perhaps paradoxical, then, that cultural forms developed in the
United States, such as rap, f ree-style graffiti, and o
 thers explored in vari
ous chapters of this volume, have flourished as modalities of protest in
the Arab uprisings. Although rap, graffiti, and o
 thers have received a fair
share of attention, this pales in comparison to the hype that surrounded
the use of social media such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter during
the Arab uprisings. As Frank Rich wrote in the New York Times, “The
talking-head invocations of Twitter and Facebook instead take the form
of implicit, simplistic Western chauvinism. How fabulous that two
great American digital innovations can rescue the downtrodden, unwashed masses.”28 The discourse privileging American technology in
positive Arab political change has a long history in U.S. public discourse
and harks back to Daniel Lerner’s influential book The Passing of Traditional Society (1958), which was foundational to the modernization paradigm in international relations and comparative politics and to the
development communication paradigm in international communication
studies.29
The Passing of Traditional Modernity is a heuristic site to examine the
imbrication of the M
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pire. The book is based on approximately three hundred surveys conducted in the early 1950s in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and
Syria. Lerner identified three types of persons—the traditionalist, transitionalist, and modernist—and argued that people moved from the first
to the third category through empathy. The media, which depicted a
world larger than the traditionalists’, created a desire for social mobility,
what Lerner dubbed “psychic mobility.” As Shah writes, the book was a
product of its time, s haped by the forces of Cold War geopolitics (the
book was funded by the Voice of America to learn more about Arab media audiences to better counter Soviet broadcasting); the rise of behavioral science at U.S. research universities, which encouraged the systematic
study of social-cultural dynamics; and the advent of racial liberalism,
which located social change in cultural patters rather than immutable racial characteristics, which was progressive thinking for the 1950s.30 The
Passing of Traditional Modernity has had an enduring influence on American perceptions of the Arab world, finding its most amplified manifestation in George W. Bush’s Greater Middle East initiative—“Modernizing
the M
 iddle East,” the subtitle of Lerner’s book, echoes the Bush administration’s “Reforming the Middle East.”
In ensuing years, the field of communication research as an academic
discipline, like the discipline of American studies, developed a social scientific epistemology adequate for its closeness to American government
policymakers. It was made policy relevant but not intellectually autonomous. As Hanno Hardt wrote in a landmark essay critiquing the U.S. tradition in media research:
This tradition fails to consider historical growth as an indissoluble
process that cannot be dissected into empirical parts or facts and
prefers to treat communication and media studies in terms of a
series of specific, isolated social phenomena. In this context, it seems
that the field suffers not only from a cultural bias but also from a
social scientific bias toward searching for laws governing the
relationship of media and society. As a result, empirical research
techniques obscure cultural differences.31
But global media research underwent a momentous shift in the 1970s.
The United States—state, economics, and culture—has historically had
an enormous impact on global popular culture and has featured prominently in academic and public debates about cultural power and globalization. Influenced by a handful of radical U.S. intellectuals like Herbert
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Schiller, whose books Mass Communication and American Empire (1971) and
Communication and Cultural Domination (1976) w
 ere foundational to developing a globally oriented political economy of media and information, the “media imperialism” perspective dominated the study of global
media and cultural flows in the 1970s.32 This approach focused on the
politico-economic and cultural inequalities between what w
 ere then
known as “First,” where the United States was a dominant country, and
“Third” Worlds. In t hose years countries opposed to global U.S. media
and cultural hegemony used meetings of the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to coordinate and
publicize their grievances against Western dominance, especially against
the United States. This led to the New World Information Order (later
known as the New World Information and Communication Order)
resolution against the neoliberal “free flow of information” doctrine,
which UNESCO’s 1976 General Conference endorsed in Nairobi,
Kenya.33
Cold War geopolitics undergirded the New World Information Order debate as it influenced Lerner’s work a few decades earlier: the Reagan administration and U.S. media bitterly fought UNESCO and
opponents of the “free flow” doctrine. U.S. officials attacked UNESCO
for its attempts to “control press freedom,” and Elliott Abrams, then assistant secretary of state, called on UNESCO to consider the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as a template for a global policy
regime.34 The New York Times editorialized that “if it turns out to be impossible to reject this attempt to tamper with our basic principles, t here
is always the alternative of rejecting UNESCO itself,” and soon the
United States and United Kingdom suspended their memberships in
UNESCO.35 This led to the slow decline of the debate over global U.S.
cultural influence in UNESCO, which the United States rejoined, of all
times, during George W. Bush’s infamous “Axis of Evil” speech.

Outline of the Book
American Studies Encounters the M
 iddle East captures an important yet
fleeting moment in the encounter between America and the Arab world.
The book’s focus on this time of widespread popular discontent, normative fragmentation, and economic uncertainty, in addition to adding
historical depth to current problematics, casts the American–Arab encounter as the nexus for a new, transnational, global American studies
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capable of shedding light on the momentous ongoing transformations.
The book is organized in two sections.
The first section of the book, “The Arab–U.S. Encounter: Entangled
Histories and Contemporary Flows,” features chapters on historical linkages and transborder exchanges between the United States and the Arab
world from the eighteenth to the twenty-first centuries. The six chapters in this section demonstrate the breadth and depth of America’s historical Arab entanglements. From the place of Islam in eighteenth-century
American literature, the fascinating journey of an Algerian in colonial
Virginia, together the chapters show that the U.S.–Arab encounter has
for long haunted reading, writing, travel, politics, media and popular culture. In “Diabolical Enterprises and Abominable Superstitions: Islam
and the Conceptualization of Finance in Early American Literature,”
Adam John Waterman explores how “Islam” operated as an important
fount of cultural imagination for the early United States, through close
readings of several early American writings focusing on finance, notably speculation. In so d
 oing, he questions the dominant narrative that
compares a long-standing European interaction with the Middle East and
Islam against a putatively and relatively recent encounter between the
worlds of Islam and the United States. In the same vein, Judith E. Tucker
explores an Appalachian legend in “Salim the Algerine: The Muslim
Who Strayed into Colonial Virginia.” The character at the heart of the
chapter was captured in turn by Spanish pirates who took him to Amer
ica and sold him as a slave, then was captured by Shawnee Native Americans after he escaped. Through this engrossing story, Tucker explores
the role of Islam in the changing meanings of dislocation, religion, and
identity in the early American–Arab/Ottoman encounter. In “ ‘Race’ and
‘Blackness’ in Moroccan Rap: Voicing Local Experiences of Marginality,” Christina Moreno Almeida explores the specific dynamics of connection between Moroccan and United States rap scenes, looking at how
Moroccan rappers recruit the U.S. civil rights movement to explore the
intricacies of their own marginality. Finding U.S. culture to be a source
for the cultural imaginations of young Moroccan rappers, Almeida concludes that “blackness” in Morocco goes beyond race to signal poverty
and exclusion. In turn, Rayya El Zein’s “Call and Response, Radical Belonging and Arabic Hip-Hop in ‘the West,’ ” develops the notion of radical belonging as a “co-construction of community and identity” that
she unravels via studying Arab hip-hop concerts in the West, identifying the kinds of politics produced in t hese performance. Focusing on
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how U.S. rhetoric was received and critiques in Egypt, Mounira Soliman,
in “The Reception of U.S. Discourse on the Egyptian Revolution: Between the Popular and the Official,” aims at understanding how U.S.
popular culture and satire, with an interesting discussion of U.S. fast
food, shaped Egyptian perceptions of American agendas in the uprisings.
Finally, in “Arab Spring, American Autumn,” Brian T. Edwards reflects
on his own experience with American studies as a globalizing formation,
concluding with thoughts on how the decline of U.S. influence in the
Arab world is intertwined with the rise of Arab cultural production redolent with fragments of America.
The second section of the book, “Infrastructures of Control: From
Mythmaking to Drone Warfare” moves the discussion to a techno-
politico-economic plane while examining the discourses underlying
transnational infrastructures of control and warfare. Waleed Hazbun’s
“The Uses of Modernization Theory: American Foreign Policy and
Mythmaking in the Arab World,” elaborates a “strategic logic of modernization” that, among other things, recruited the U.S. military as an
agent in the modernization of the Arab world. Hazbun concludes with
political and epistemological insights on how to better manage the Arab–
American relation, with a note on the special role that the American
University of Beirut can play in that process. Craig Jones, in “Traveling
Law: Targeted Killing, Lawfare, and the Deconstruction of the Battlefield,” explores the circulation of the notion of targeted killing between
Israel and the United States and deploys the concept of “lawfare” to explore both the “weaponization of the law” and the way law has acted as
a discursive naturalizer of targeted killing. When one thinks of tactics
of extra-or parajudicial assassination, drones come to mind. Ashley Dawson, in “Drone Executions, Urban Surveillance, and the Imperial Gaze,”
offers a transnational and transhistorical study of imperial visuality
beginning with the British Raj in Calcutta in the nineteenth c entury,
Algiers under French control in the twentieth c entury, and U.S. war
videogames in the twenty-first century, concluding that “drones are part
of a long history of sanitizing imperial violence.” Finally, moving to the
contemporary Middle East, Helga Tawil-Souri, argues, in “Technology’s
Borders: The U.S., Palestine, and Egypt’s Digital Connection,” that U.S.-
developed and -funded technology plays a contradictory role in both
Egypt and Palestine, underscoring the fragility of notions of “opening”
and “borderlessness” and asserting the lingering importance of space in
global geopolitics. In “The Counterrevolutionary Year: The Arab Spring,
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the Gulf Cooperation Council, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the M
 iddle
East,” Osamah Khalil identifies and analyzes a gap between U.S. rhetoric,
which supported the emancipatory forces of revolution, with actual
U.S. actions, which supported reactionary players in counterrevolutions
aiming to bury the Arab uprisings. He concludes with thoughts on
American hegemony in the age of Obama.
Collectively, the chapters in American Studies Encounters the Middle East
are intended to provoke new questions about the f utures of American
studies as well as the future of American political and military engagement
in the Middle East. Rethinking past cultural encounters may suggest
examples of conviviality and cohabitation across the United States and
Middle East that seem impossible, if not unfathomable in the present.
Moreover, taking stock of the changing nature of the United States in
the world at the end of the American C
 entury and during the revolutions
within the Arab world may suggest new possibilities for the location
and subject of American studies.
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